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DOCLMENT 1547
Draft Recommendation
on airborne suryeillance
The Assembll',
(r) Considerurg that space-based systems, ow'ing to certam rrtnnsic features, do not meet all the
requirements involved m morutorrng the earth's surface, partrcularll' where continurty of observatron, data
precision and flenbrlrtl'of use are concemed;
(i, Takmg the vrew therefore that satellite systems, lvtuch are designed to meet cerLain strategc needs,
must be supplemented by airbome systems capable of meeturg tactrcal requrrements;
(r") Bearing rn mind that the nelv geopolitical situatioq characterised by a large number of local conflicts
that may be far apart, confirms how rnportant are the requirements described above;
(iv) Notrrg that the recent conflict rn Bosma and Herzegovrna has served to tughlight deficrencies rn ground
surveillance, thereby confirmurg that arrbome facrlrties supplementrrg a satellite option would be a more
effective wa1'of meetrng operational needs;
(") Regrettrrg that the Councrl has not yet tasked the Planning Cell to analyse areas m wluch the airbome
surveillance needs of the vanous European eunues converge:
(w) Consrdenng that such an analysis should lead to the standardrsation of headquarters requirements, so
that WEU's needs in tlls respect can be defined.
(wr) Porntrng also to the fact that the Planrung Cell could draw up draft rrulitary specifications and thus
guide the work of WEAG Panel I, which would have the specific advantage of improlrng Europe's rndustnal
capacrty and competrtlveness rn this area;
(urr) Noturg the exstence wrthin NATO of a study group tasked w,rth assessrrg Alliance needs rr terms of
arrbome surveillance,
(x) Takrng account of the fact that ttus assessment should be the basis for determrmng the number of
s)'stems necessaw and procunng the system or systems selected;
(*) Considenng that such decisions are of major unportance. especially from an urdustnal pourt of rierv,
(n) Notrrg furthermore that various European coturtries have made substantral rrvestnents in arrbome
surveillance rn recent years, wrthout a srrgle study berng undertaken rn the framework of Europcan
cooperation;
(xn) Observing, however, that the work of various kinds done so far shows many srnilantres, suggestrng a
high degree of convergence wrth regard to needs;
(xni) Recognisrng that, at a time when defence budgets in the WEU countnes are subject to severe
restrictions, it is absolutely' essential to actueve a defirution of European requrrements reflectrng vrrtually all
national needs and wtuch rmght also rnclude some items rntended to meet highly specific requirements;
(nl Notulg finally' that the WEU Council is making only verl' lmited use of the Satellite Centre,
particularly in uew of the new operational capabilities the Hehos I satellite bnngs to rt and that the Satellite
Centre's onginal terms of reference mclude analy'sis of imagery obtained by means other than by satelhte,
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.INCIL
l. Task the Planmng Cell with an analysis of areas rn whrch the arrbome surveillance needs of the various
member countnes converge,
2. Ensure that such analysis leads to standardisation of the various requirements, makrng it possible to
identify WEU's needs in ttus respect;
3. Ensure that a study is made of the vanous European govemment and urdustnal prqects and
progrzmlmes in thrs field, takrng maximum cost*ffectiveness rnto account at all trmes;
4. Ask the Planmng Cell to draw up dmft military specifications that would guide the work of WEAG
Panel I, thereby,helprng rmprove European industry's capacities and competitiveness,
5. Ensure that the results of all such work are taken rnto consideration by member countnes rn instrtutions
which, hke the Atlantic Alliance, are soon to take decisions on operatronal requirunents ur respect of airbome
surveillance and on the selectron and procurement ofthe necessary systems;
6. Make more use of the facilities of the WEU Satellite Centre and especially of the operational
capabilities of Hehos l;
7. Ensure tlnt the Planmng Cell and the lntelligence Sectron are closely urvolved in the work and use of
the Satellite Centre
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
L Among the final consrderations set out m the
recent report on "WEU and Helios 2"1, the
rmportance was underhned rl ar-ground
surveillance terms of combrung airbome and
satellrte optrons In other words. data gathered
through the usc of stratcgic (satellite) systems
should be supplemented b1'mformatron obtarned r,ra
tactrcal (airbomc) s1'sterns.
2. Indeed. as ue shall examrne in further detail
rn a subsequent chapter, certam rntnnsrc features of
space-based s)'stems mean they' cafllot full1' mect
all requrrements. particularly u'here continurtl' of
observatron. data precision and flexibrlrtv ofusc are
concemed. hence thc need for other information
sources such as airbomc systems, to supplement
data obtamed b1' satellrte
3 Thrs nced is becomrng rncreasrngll'evrdent in
vierv of the nelv gcopolrtical situatron, u'hrch rs
charactcnsed b1' a large numbcr of local conflrcts,
makrng t essenlal for satellrte surveillance
capabrlrtres to bc supplemented b1' data-gathenng
facrlitres available on airbomc svstems.
4. The need that must be addressed then rs hou'
to obtarn ffirmatron on encmv movemcnts drectll'
the) occur and ensure virtually' rnstantaneous
communicatron u-rth all forccs rnvolved so these can
be cngaged rmmcdrately The conflrct m Bosrua and
Herzegovina served to lughlight thesc problems and
provrded an rllustratron of horv iur airborne
component \\'as used to supplement satellrte
facilrties m order to resoh'e them effectrvelv
5. NATO's mvolvement. for the first trmc rn rts
hrstorl'. m cnsn-management operatrons under
Uruted Nations mandatc m formcr Yugoslalra.
prnpourtcd dcficrencrcs m surv'crllance capabilrtres.
partrcularlv ur terms of the detcctron and morutonng
of ground movements m areas of interest It became
clear that such facrlrtres are essential rn order to
support polrtrcal decrsions taken wrth a \'1e\\, to
specrfic actr,rtres or to planmng w'hat defensive
actron should bc takcn
6 Thus rn 199.1 an mrtratil'e rvas takcn in
NATO to crcate a study' group tasked uith
pror.rdrng the orgarusatron *ith lvhat rvas ongrnallv
refened to as the Alharce ground surverllance
(AGS) capabrhq' and later became knoun as arr-
ground. or airbomc. survcillancc This uutratn'e.
first set ur motron b1' the Unitcd States. ultrallv
stemmcd fiom gcnume nccd. but \\as also
undoubtedll' rnflucnced bl the fact that thc Uruted
Statcs already' had rts oun svstem. the Jourt
Survcrllance Targct and Auack Radar Sy'stcm
(JSTARS), ii'Luch had bccn used in operation
Desert Shreld.IDcsert Storm rn August 1993
7 Your Rapporteur u'as told that x'hen an
rutnl assessmcnt of Alhance requirements for an
AGS capabilrt_v x'as canrcd out, the numbcr of
planes mvolvcd proved to bc too hrgh fuust over 50)
Subsequent drscussions lcd to consrderation as to
whether NATO should hal'e a core fleet covenng
rmrururn essentral rcqurrcments In the Unrtcd
States' vreu'. thesc rcqurrements should bc met
rmmedratch' through NATO procuremcnt of
exrstrng s)'stems. namelv JSTARS (4-5 plancs) and
Honzon (8 s1'stems)
8. Thrs mrrumum requirement represcnts u'hat
is essenilal for deahng urth local conflrcts such as.
for example. that rn formcr Yugoslavra In thc
event of a conflrct of largcr propofirons, those
natrons halrng thcrr oun facilrtres sould make them
available to thc Alhance.
9 Tlls proposal raiscs various problems, the
first berng to define the srze of the corc or mirumum
fleet: secondh'. rt ralses both ma.1or mdustnal rssucs
and the matter of the degree of goodurll rt cur bc
assumed natlons urll shou' m makrng thcrr
rcspectn'e assets avarlable to NATO s'hen thc
occasion anscs.
l0 Thcse mrrumum needs therefore havc to be
dcfincd and an agrccmcnt reachcd on organlslng a
svstem for assrgmng natronal assets u'llch at the
same tlmc addresscs the conccms of the smaller
nafions that have no such svstcms but u'ish to drag'
on NATO's for thcrr oun natronal ends
I I Hou'er,cr thc marn problem rs undoubtedll'of
an mdustnal order. rn \1e\\' of the fact that fourI Document 1525
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countnes hal'e air ground survcrllance (AGS)
s)'stems. u'luch are erther alreadt, operatronal or at
van'mg stages of development These are the US
JSTARS s)'stcm. the Unrted Krngdom's Astor
svstem. France's Mosta and Horizon svstems and
Italr/s Creso s)'stem. A chaptcr of the report uill be
devoted to examrmng them further.
12. At present. an embn'oruc prqect office and a
steenng commrttee already exrst The office is to
becomc an Agencv (srmrlar to that set up for the
European Frghter Arcraft (EFA) as soon as a firm
decision rs taken by the Conference of National
Armaments Directors. u'hrch could takc place
around Apnl 1997 Pnor to tlus. NATO's Mrlrtan'
Commrttee should first find that the project rs urgcnt
and grve rts oprruon on w'hrch system should be
chosen.
l3 Accordrng to De.fense Newsl, SFIAPE
(Supreme Headquarters Allied Pouers Europe)
officrals are in no doubt as to its urgencl' and have
said as much to NATO's Militarl' Commrttee
De.fense ly'ews adds that thc fact that the pro.lect rs
urgent grves JSTARS. burlt b1'Norttrop Grumman
Corporatron, thc cdge over lts nvals that are strll
undcr dcvelopment. although ther constructors sa),
thel' could bnng therr svstcms up to operational
level rmmedrately and clarm thq' uould be cheaper
14. From anothcr angle. WEU has not yet
dtscusscd arrborne sun'eillance and has no plans to
do so The Armaments Secretanat has not
consrdered the mattcr. nor has the Planmng Cell
been tasked bv the Councrl rr that connection
Hou'ever tlus should not, m vour Rapporteur's vte\\'.
prevent the Assembh''s Technological and
Acrospace Commrttee reachrng rts oun conclusrons
and endeavounng to sccurc the adoptron bv mcmbcr
countnes. actmg as WEU alone or rvrthm NATO.
of a firm stance m defencc of Europe's polrtrcal.
mrhtary and urdustnal rntcrcsts
II. Ground sumeillancefrom space
15 Over the last srx r-ears the Commrttee has
produced erght rcports on the subject of mrlrtan'
observailon satellrtes and the developmcnt of a
European space-based obscn'atron svstem for
secuntv and defencc purposes Tx'o colloquies on
these issucs have also been orgarused. u'tuch grves
an idea of therr lmportancc and our concern tlnt
Europe should have its oun independent sur-
verllance system which, in our vrerv, is essential to
the secuntl'and defence ofour contrnent.
16 In 1986, France launched rts Helios
prograrnme for a nulitan' obscrvation svstem bl,
satellite Wlule France's decision to seek the
cooperatlon of other countries rvas influenced b1'
lugh programme costs. political consideratrons also
steered it m that drrcction Italy' and Sparr lorred
the Helios I programme. takmg fundrng shares of
l4o/o and 70% respectrvell'.
17. The Helios I programme. uhose final cost rs
assessed as berng m thc regron of ten brllion francs.
conslsts of tg'o satellrtes, Hehos lA and 1B Helios
lA rvas launched on 7 Jull' 1995 br an Ananc 4
rocket from the Kourou base rn Gurana vvlulc
construction of Helios lB began in mid-1995 and rs
due for completion at the cnd of the current year
Helios lB's launch date urll depend on Hehos IA's
performance and on launch forecasts for thc Hehos
2 satellrte. to u'Luch x'e shall retum later.
18. The theoretical lifetime of Hehos 1 satellites
is behvcen four and five I'ears and they uergh some
2 5 tonnes Thev are desrgned for high-resolution
(circa I metre) optrcal observation. s'luch restncts
their obscrvation capabiht)' to dal,hght hours rn
good r,rsrbrlrtr'. Helios I is stationed m a
sunsrnchronous polar orbrt at an altrtude of 677 l<rn
and has a repeat flyovcr tune of24 hours, grven rts
speed ofroughly 7.8 km per second
19 
. 
As vour Rapporteur noted rn Document
1525' the satellte's orbit and numoeu\rnng
capabrlitres guarantee that a grven locatron can bc
observed everl' da1' and that 15 or so sccnes can be
taken dail1' from orbrts correspondrng to pnontl
rnterest zones such as Europe, Afnca and the
Mrddle East
20 The Helios 1 programme is based on the
same platform as the Spot 4 crvilian satellite and the
general architecturc of both satellrtes is very similar,
shorung that optrnum slnerg), can be obtained
behleen the cir,rhan and mrlrtary sectors. Moreover
Hehos I has shou.n that a mrhlan' space-based
observatron svstem can be shared qutte
sailsfactonlv and that the orgarusational set-up
3 "WEU and Hehos 2". Document 1525. report
submrtted on behalf of the Technological and
Acrospace Commrttee b1'Mr Lenzer. Rapporteur2 9-15 September, 1996
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requrred for constructron and operatlon of the
satelhte can be small. flcxible and functional.
2l The first Helios images reachcd the WEU
Satellrte Centre at Torrejon (Madnd). on I Mal'
1996 and were rmmodratell'analy,sed. rn accordance
uith rnstructions conceming Sarajevo recerved from
the Plarmng Cell.
22. The need both to replacc the Hehos I
satcllrtes and to upgrade the programme has lcd to a
ncu'systcm. Hehos 2, berng built This drau's on
thc expcnence gained ilrth rts prcdecessor.
urcorporates nelv technologres and rmprol'es the
programme by rntroducing rnfrarcd components for
rught-trmc obscrvatron. thus allourng morc data to
be gathered
23. Lrke Helros I and Spot 4. Hehos 2 rs gearcd
to srncrgv between the crralian and mlrtan' sectors
through compatibrlrt_v uith the civrhan satellrte
Spot 5 Beanng thrs rn mrnd. the lessons leamt and
expenence garned from Helios I should make rt
possrble rrrth Helios 2 to cut the trmc required for
collectrrg lmages b1' a half or a thrrd and obtarn a
detcctron capabilrtv far greater than that of rts
predecessor, ourng to rts abrlrtv to take scenes
srmultaneously and its lugher resolutron (of the
order of 50 cm).
24 On 7 Decembcr 1995. France and Germanv
agreed to cooperate on carth observatron usurg
nuhtary satellites. The agreement covers the French
Hchos 2 programme and the German Horus radar
satellite project Srrce then, talks betrvecn the two
countnes. manly rntended to clanfi' the financral
and rndustnal aspects of cooperatron. have run up
agarnst Germanv's budget problems. r,rrth the
German defence mrnister rrsisturg repeatedll'that he
drd not have the necessary resources for tlus llpe of
projcct.
25 Hou€ver, all thc sigrs nou' are that the
prqcct will go ahead, thanks to the rnterventron of
the German Foreigrr Affars and Research
Mimstersa. but rt rs clear that the longer it takes for
the agreements to bc firmed up. the more drfficult rt
uill be to keep to the schedule envrsaged for the
start of the prqect
26. In principle. the launch of Helios 2 is
schcduled for 2001 Prolect defimtion studres on
Horus arc to bcgrn rn 1998. constructlon rull foliou'
m the vear 2000 urd ts launch should takc placc rn
2005. Sparn and Itall' are also u'arfing for thc
agreemcnts bchrccn thc French and the Germans to
take therr final shapc bcforc possrbly 
.louung the
project alongsrde thesc hl'o countnes
27 As lrttlc urformation rs availablg on the
Horus radar satellrtc. all that can b0 sard at thrs
stagc rs that rt urll makc 2.I-hour obscrvatron
possrble, urth a vcry hrgh ueld. rrrespcctn,e of
atmosphenc conditrons Thc platform urll be
specrallr' adapted to satelhtcs in thc thrco-tonnc
category' and the satellrtc archtccture urll be
desrgned around thc pavload. Lastly'. Horus rs to
have spthetrc aperlure radar
2tt The Helios I programmc consrsts of hro
scgments. the Hchos space componcnt 
- 
ufuch
compnses the satcllite and the statron-kocprng centrc
- 
and the user ground component. ufuch consrsts of
the Hehos maln centres and thc image-recen rng
centres
29 The dutrcs of thc station-kccprng ccntre arc to
operate and morutor the satellite on a darlv basrs.
through hvo control rooms, the satcllrte control
centre 
- 
uhrch pror,rdcs an onJmc hnk to the
satellrte and cames out programmcd operatrons
whcn the satellrte flres ol'er the telecommand
statlons 
- 
and the ulhhes managemcnt centrc uhrch
manages thc satellrtcs and therr parloads off-hne
Thc utilitrcs managemcnt centrc preparcs the
operatlons. in particular the satellrte programmng
messages, that are draun up on the basrs of u'ork
schedulcs recervcd from the user ground component
30. As has bccn sard. thc user ground component
pnmanlv consists of thc Helios maln centres and
rmage-receir.rng ccntres Each of the threc Hehos I
partrcrpating countnes. namell' France. Italv and
Spain. has its o\\n m:)m and imagc-receivrng
centres. The Frcnch Hchos marn centrc at Crcrl rs
the hub of the s1'stem. centrahsmg mage requests
from the thrcc countncs and rclalmg thcm to the
statron-keeprng centre for the purpose of draurng up
the satellrtc's darly ri'ork schcdule
3l Thus cach natronal Hclos marn centrc scts
ob.;ectives, states requrernents and hsts its pnontres
on the basrs of urgencv iurd the rmportancc of rts
country's needs. The Frcnch mam centre rs the
forum for tnpartrte dralogue bchveen mrlrtary
representatlves of the thrcc countnes, at uhrch
dccrsions on the darl1, programmrng schcdule are1. F-tnancral 71nes. 8 October 1996
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takcn As has just been erplarned- the programflng
schcdule rs then sent to the statron-kceping centre
u'hencc rt rs uploadcd to thc satellite Each rmage-
recelvrng centrc has rts o\\n ilnages dehl'ered to rt in
real trme or shghtlv dcfcrred trme for onu'ard
transmlssron to rts mam centre where thcv are
anall scd
32 As a result of agrccments WEU has srgrred
urth thc Helios I countnes. the WEU Satellrte
Centre has also started rccei',rng Helios rmages. as
stated earher.
33 Accordrng to Document l-52-5. to ri'llch
rcference has alrcadv bccn made. a sencs of
mcasures u-rll need to be adoptcd for the WEU
Satellrte Ccntre to bccomc genumelr' operattonal
To avoid rcpctrtron. thc Rapporteur refl:rs the reader
to the relevant passagcs of that document.
III. Requirements still to be met
34 Spacc-based observatron ls clearlv an
essentnl hnk rn the nchrork of ground sun'etllancc
svstems Obscn'atron satellrtcs also hal'e thc
advantagc of haung acccss to an)'part of the u'orld
urthout rnfringrrg the sovereigntl'of the states thu'
overflr'. as the lcgrslatlon goverxng spacc contams
no prolubrtrons on overflr'lng ail,courtn
35 Nohuthslndrng, rt has to be acknorvledgcd
that satcllrte s)'stcms do not meet even' obser-
vatronal rcquircmcnt. mamlv because t}ev arc not
partrcularlr' flexrblc rn the u'ar.the1' can bc used and
bccause thc rnformatron thel' pronde is not hkell'to
be sufficient rn rtsclf for an accuratc assessment to
be made of a grvcn srtuation rn times of conflict or
cnsls.
36 Thereforc rt rrould bc farr to assume. as the
urtroduction to the prcsent report pornts oul tlat
satcllrtc s1 stcms are essentrally' surted to collcctrng
urfomnlon for the crcatron of documcntan'
databascs and for global stratcgrc rcconnaissance.
rathcr than for tactrcal and opcratronal recon-
nalssancc. ur thrs last arca. accurate onhne rntelh-
gcnce ls essentral and thrs car onlv be obtaured
usmg a rangc of drffercnt slstems that are extremclv
flcxrble ur thcir usc.
(r) Obse rvotton conltruil 0,
37 Thc concepts of pcrmanent obsen'atton and
onhne data rclav arc ncreasmglr'fird-g apphcation
m srtuatrons u'here armed forces constantll'need to
have the fullest possrblc rnformation available to
them so as to rcach rrstant dccistons on the best
course ofactron to be adopted ur the field
38. Irrcspectn'c of altrtude, a satellrte u'rll onlv
ovcrflr'the samc pornt after n'hat rs bound to be a
farrl1' long rnterval. If observatron of the entrre
planet is rcquired. the satellrtc urll have to bc placed
m sunsrnchronous orbrt at arl altrtude of
approKmatcll, 900 hn. It takes rt some 102
mrnutes to travel one such orbit and an lnterval of
several dars can elapsc before t retums to
practrcalll' the same orbrt
39 A srmrlar problem anses w'hen delivenng
observation data to the ground user statlon as the
statron has to be "visrble" to the satelhtc Hence a
satellrte-based svstem cannot b1' rtself dehver
permancnt observatron
(u) Observafion preuston
40 Even a high-lield satelhte rs hnuted rr the
rnformatron it can gather Satellrtcs equrpped wrth
scnsors operatrng rn the rasrble and evcn ur the
rnfrared spectrums can prove ileffecttle f the area
of rnterest is verled b1' cloud cover of a givcn
thrckness
41 Although sufficrentlv hlgh resolution to
rdcntrfi' small objects can bc obtarncd b1, rcducrng
the altrtudc of the orbrtrng satellrte, tlus srgruficantly
reduccs rts hfe-span as the atnosphere applies
consrderablv more drag to rts movemcnt m orbrts at
an altrtude of lcss than 500 km Furthermore. to
operatc rn tlus uaf uould mean a large suppll' of
engurc-fuel bcrng camed on board. hence the nccd
for a healrer and morc cxpensl\,'c satelhte.
42. To avoid cloud-cover problcms. rt is
planncd. bv drnt of much effort. to put radar
satellrtcs suppll'rng hrgh-resolution rmages mto
orbit These basicallv havc the advantage of
operatmg ror.rnd-the-clock, regardless of atnos-
phenc condrtrons. but thcrr tugh clectncal po\\'er
consumptron prer,'cnts therr berrg used contmuoush'
ovcr a long period
43 Moreover. radar satcllrtes havc to be placed
rn a tugh cnough orbrt to ensure a sufficient hfe-
sparl 
- 
a requiremcnt hardlv conducrve to high
resolutron unlcss rccourse rs had to a ven' long
mtegratron pcnod u'llch has the dtsadvantage,
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however. of reducng the possibiliry' of obsenang a
wrde area.
(nt) Flenbhty of use
44 Situations may cvolvc so raprdlv that the
trme that elapses belreen an event occumng and rts
notrfication to the relevant authoritics must be short
enough for the appropnatc dccrsion to be taken and
rmplemented effectrvell'
45. It must therefore be possible for surveillance
svstems to be used flexrbly' and to be capable of
recer!1ng and transmrttmg urformatron to the
appropnate authontics rn a ven,short space of trme
Furthermore. ur recent vears, theatres of operation
have become much larger urth pockets of fightrng
that are wrdeh, drspersed. Such factors make
surveillance especialll' drfficult and mean that the
systems used must be fully complementan'
46. At present, satellites are not able. for the
techrucal reasons rvluch have just been referred to,
to fully meet the requrements of flcxrbilitl'. specd
and precision w-luch are norv tl,te ordcr of the day
47 . In strategrc and tactrcal terms, arr
reconnaissance rs underuably an assct whcn rt comes
to evaluatrng threats and conducturg operations as it
makes rt possrble to crcate the databases that are
essentnl for comprlurg documentary. rrtelligence.
momtonng dcvelopments. dra*rng up orders of
battle and producrng theatre and target urformation
kts.
48. At thc polrtrcal level, accurate mformatron
about the actrr,rtres of a suspect state can. rf
convey'cd wrth enough advance notrce. hclp ensurc
that an appropnate decision is taken or serve to alert
the attention of the intematronal authontrcs Tlls
preventative approach is a crucial one rn todar''s
u'orld. Hou'ever in order to make rt possrble. onhnc
observation and transmrsslon arc a must and
surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, hehcopters
and drones can meet tlus requirement.
A h e r s u rv ei I I an c e sy- fi ems
49. There are a number of air s1'stems available
to supplement sun'crllance bv satellite, each wrth its
own specral features and designed to meet specrfic
needs. Generalll, speakrng, thel' complement one
anothermagivenarea.
(t) The hgh-alnnrde Jltng plarform
50 Thc capabilities of tlus svstem. n'hrch sccms
thc best surtcd to permanent obscn'atron. ri rll be
descnbed m a later sectron. The svstcm ls onc
rifuch allou's ven' hrgh-resolutron rmagcs to be
produced. makrng rt possrble to recognisc medrum-
size targets. and enablcs a smglo zonc to bc
obsen'ed usurg drffcrcnt tlpcs of scnsor. These
svstems normallv usc rvidc-bodrcd arcraft as ther
platform
(u) Helrcopter q,stems
5l Thesc svstcms have the advantage of berng
very flexrble m ther use Helicopters can take off
qurckly in an emergencv and make drrectlv for the
surverllance area. Hehcopter-mounted svstems can
be used rndependently prouded the arrcraft has thc
same cqulpment as the ground statron
52. A helicopter's field of aclon rs restnctcd to
tactrcal surveillance to assrst ground forces and
proudes rnformation about rvhat hcs ahcad urd
u'hether it moves Its operatrng range docs not
normalll'exceed 200 km Hehcoptcrs mav also bc
used rn conlunction ri'ith hrgh-altrtude fixed-u'urg
s)'stems. for observrng arcas maskcd by the
contours of thc tcrram Frnallr'. hchcoptcrs can be
used m defirung and optrmrsrng the tasks of drones
or UAVs (unmanncd arr veluclcs)
(ur) Drones
53. Thc rmportance of UAVs has grorrn surcc
thc cnd of thc Gulf War and such droncs are berng
rncrcasrngly rridcly' used Although therr operatmg
range is limited to a felv hundred krlometres abovc
thc battlefield and thcir relativell' slou' specds makc
them particularll' lulnerable to surface-to-arr
defences, these svstems are of maJor mtercst to
armres ourng to their low cost. flexrbilitv of usc and
because no loss of life rs urvolr,cd
54. Drones fall mto thrcc catcgorics, cach
correspondrng to a drffcrcnt opcrational levcl:
regrmcntal levcl correspondrng to a
range of roughll' ten krlometres and
frcqucntll' uscd b1' armt' rcgrments;
tactrcal lel'el correspondrrg to a range of
approxrmatell' I 00 lan.
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strategrc lcvel corrcspondrng to a range
of some I 500 km and used mamlv bv atr
forces
IV. Capubilities of airborne obsen'ation system-s
55 The maxrmum flrght altrtude of an arbomc
svstcm rs of the order of 30 km At that altrtude the
radro honzon hcs at a drstance of some 600 km 
-
thc optrcal honzon rs nearer but tlus factor is of lrttle
rntercst smcc atmosphenc attenuatlon 'v'cn' qutcklv
restncts thc obscn'atron rangc It should be noted
that drstancc fiom the radro horizon ts not a useful
mcasurcmcnt as lt corrcsponds to a grazrng angle
Nou- the carth's surfacc rs made up of reliefs and
superstructurcs xllch crcate largc numbcrs of areas
ufuch are rn shadou'u'hosc sze rs largclv dependent
on the urgle of mcrdcncc and rt is vcry drfficult to
detcrmrne the rrrlrurnum angle necessan' for
effective observatron.
56 Srnce fl1rng at an altrtude of 30 km rcquires
the use of aerodlnamrcs and propulsron tcchno-
logrcs rnvohrng lrglrli specrahsed dcvclopment
rvork. thel'are vcn' costlv The questton then anscs
as to uhether there rs an obsen'atron altitude that is
morc acccssrblc fi nancralll'
57 An altrtude of 20 hn mrght be consrdcrcd
Thrs rarscs far fcu'er problcms as rt hes at the lrrut
of altrtudcs used for commercnl flights and is. b1'
the same tokcn. onc s'hcrc usable technologtes have
been mastcrcd At thrs altrtude the effectne
obscnatron rangcs arc 280 and 170 km
58 For obscrvatron of thc carth's surface to vreld
usable data for tacfical purposcs. rt has to bc
urtuallv contrnuous. For pcrmancnt obsen'atton to
be camed out effectrvelr'. thc ratro of outuard and
mu'ard Joumev trmcs to tlme spent at thc
observatron statlon must bc l'cn' lou. rmprovmg
obscn'ation bv reducmg transrt trme ls possrblc onlv
bv rncrcasing speed 
- 
ullch rs a costlv optron 
-
uhrle anv mprovement mvollmg an cxlensron of
the trmc spent at the obsen'atron statron has as rts
first conscqucnce arl mcrease rn the amount of fucl
camcd aboard and the use of lorv-consumptron
engrncs
-59 The mass of fucl camed b1'an aircraft forms
part of thc authonscd parload mass If large
quar.ltltres of fucl arc to bc carricd, the mass of the
obsen'atron s)'stcm has to be reduced accordrnglv
bv talong aboard onl1,rvhat is stnctly necessan'.
60 Equipment that ls stnctll' nccessan'
obleously urcludes observatton scnsors and remote
transmission svstems for data gathered bv the
sensors It *rll be noted that lt rs not ncccssan' to
have data merge and anall'sis s1'stcms aboard. much
lcss opcrations control svstems Wllch. then are the
obscrv'ation sensors that are absoluteh' esscntnl?
6l Remotc obsen'atron (drstances of ovcr
I00km) rmphcs the use of radar sensors and
clectromagnctlc mterc€ptlon svstems. nfule use of
optroruc sensors rs confined to ranges under 50 km
rf propagatron through the louer la-vers of the
atrnosphere takes placc over a long drstance. One
can thereforc conclude that tlls last typc of sensor is
onlv of anv real advantagc u,hen tt is possrble
practrcallv to overfl1' thc zones of rnterest 
- 
as
satellrtcs do 
- 
preferablv uhcn no cloud lavers are
present. even rfthese arc brokcn
62 The use of llgh-resolutron srnthctlc aperture
radar (SAR) and mormg target rndrcator svstems
(MTIs) rn conlunction wrth equrpment for detectrng.
locatmg and identrfl,rng electromagnettc radratton
uould appear to be the basrs of anv long-range
obsen'atron sy stem As tlls s1'stem can be urstalled
rn obsen'aIon statrons uhich are remote from
analvsrs centrcs. it must also rnclude a transmisston
facrlrh' capablc of relaung data at lugh florv ratcs
l'ra satcllrtc or. rn the absence thereof. other air or
surfacc svstcms
63 Thc hgh-resolutron SAR sl,stem must be
capable of producrng lmages with metnc resolutton
and thc movmg target rndrcator svstem of detecturg
and trackmg movmg echocs on the surface u-rthm a
requred range of spceds
64 The electromagrrctrc mterceplon s1'stem
should be capable of detectrng and prnpomtmg most
of the various emissrons ruth a rangc compatrble
ruth the srze of the area under obscn'atron
65 It rs rrteresturg to note that a comburatron of
thcsc different s\-stems on a smgle observation
platform promotes s\nergv bets'een their capabrl-
itrcs and makes for qurcker reconstrtutron of thc rcal
sltuatlon rn the zonc obsen'ed 
- 
u-hrch rs of course
the pnme purposc 
- 
bv facilitating a merger of therr
output and abol'e all bv cueurg sensors to home tn
qurcklv on rtcms of rntcrcst.
66. It u'as strcsscd carher that the tlme spent at
the obscrvatron statron should be as long as
possrble Thc obscrvatron svstem should therefore
l0
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be light enough to allos' large quantities of fuel to
be camed on board and the total platform mass
should allorv the craft to be stationed at the requrrcd
observatron altrtude from the start of the mission.
67. It should be recalled that the optimum
crursng height of an aircraft increases u.rth fucl
consumption Thus an arrcraft may,rvell have an
airframe approved for flyrng at an altitude of 20 krn
but urll onll' reach that altrtude once it has used up
nearly all of rts fuel
68 As has been explaured, the reductron ur total
platform mass achieved by optrmisrng the mass of
fuel on board presupposes optimal defimtion of the
observatron svstem so as to hmit its mass, but can
also lead to prlot and rni,rgation svstems becoming
full1' automated. ur other u'ords to the flrght creu'
being eliminated. Thrs solution is usualll'descnbed
as a "drone" and the Amencan Global Harnk
prograrnme u'hrch has recently becn launched
prolrdes a perfect illustration. lnterestrng though rt
rs, ttus solutron clearlt' calls for very heaq'
developmcnt mvestment
69. The trend tou'ards automated arrbome
platforms or drones mav lead to consrderation being
given, under certarn crrcumstances, to overfllrng
observatron areas, As explaured earher, tlus would
substantialll' ease requirements ur terms of range
rvhich u'ould mean that optroruc sensors and much
lighter radar sensors could be used, but above all it
virtuall)'overcomes the problem of areas rn shadorv.
Horvever the nsks of the platform being destroyed
by air defence means are hrgh; hence the need to
design a platform that operates xith ertreme stealth
such as Darkstar 
- 
ufuch rs likelv to rnvolve llgh
devclopment and possiblv production costs
V 0perational requirements
At WEU level
70. It has alrcadv been pourted out that WEU
has not tackled the problem of arbome surveillance
and apparenth'has no mtention of dorrg so.
7l The second part of the Petersberg
Declaration (19 June 1992) deals uith strengthemng
WEU's operational role and enr,rsages nulitary umts
orgarused on a multrnatronal and multiser"rce basis
berrg made avarlable to the Orgarusation. These
forces. actrng under WEU authoriq', outside the
frameuork of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
and Artrcle V of thc modrfied Brussels Treaty,
could be emploved for humarutanan and rcscuo
tasks. pcacckeeprng tasks and tasks of combat
forces rn cnsls management. rncludrng peacc-
makrng
72. The Planmng Ccll u'as created m thc rvake of
the Declaratron Its tasks consist mler alru of
prepanng contrngeno'plans for the emplolment of
forces under WEU ausprces and makrng recorrrmen-
dations for the necessar]' operatons command,
control. and commurucations arrangements, rnclud-
urg standrng operatmg procedures for headquarters
that mght be selected.
73. Reference should also be made to subsequent
declaratrons b1' the WEU Council of Mrnisters
wtuch also adl'ocate strengthening the Organ-
isation's operatronal role and hrghlight the rmpor-
tance m tlus connectron of rntelhgencc and sur-
verllancc It rs therefore most surpnslng that the
Councrl has not I'ct tasked the Planmng Ccll to
canl' out a studl' of Europe's nccd for an auton-
omous rrtelhgence and surveillancc s1,stem.
74. The Asscmblr'. through several of its
commrttees. has emphasised the fact that such
surveillance should not bt: confined to observatron
by' satellrte. u'hrch is onll' one sourcc of rrformatron
among others. "The results rt produces, if combined
skrlfullr', analvsed and contmuously updated. could
pror,ide the rnformation needed for a reasonable and
accountable corrrmon foreign, securiry' and defence
pohcv"s
75 Frralll'. rt rs regret[able to note that the
Council has failcd to urstruct the Planmng Cell to
anah'se areas u.here the nccds of the vanous
European armed forces converge, to idcnIfi' and
standardrsc possrblc corrrmon needs and drarv up
draft mrlrtary spccrficatron sheets u'hrch u'ould bc
extrcmcly useful for guldmg the u'ork of WEAG
Pancl I: one of the latter's alms rs rn fact to promotc
cqurpment programmes u'tuch arc cost-cffcctn,e and
meet the opcralonal needs of the WEAG nations.
thus rmproung Europe's urdustnal capacrtv and
competitn'eness m the defence field
At national levels
76. As no assessment of Europe's overall
rntelligence and sun'eillance needs has yet been
5. Document 1517 "A European intelligence
pohc\'". Rapporteur, Mr Baumel.
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made. nohuthstandurg thc gurdclmcs lard donn by'
the Councrl of Mrmsters at lts meetmg rn Madnd on
14 Novembcr 1995. u'c must confinc oursclves to
an analvsrs of thc nccds of mdrvrdual Europcan
countnes erther *hcre thcsc havc bccn dcfincd
and/or u'here mformatron about them rs avarlablc
11 In the earlr. 1980s Francc launchcd a
programme of arrbome platforms rntended for
battleficld sun'crllance covenng a relatively' modest
rangc (around 100 km) and lurutrng surveillance
rcqulrements to movrng objects. The programme
led to the Honzon s1'stem u'hrch sill be drscusscd ut
the follourng chapter.
78 In 199-5. Great Bntarn commrssioned a
prehmman' defimtron studl' from trlo mdustnal
groups 
- 
one Amencan and onc Bntrsh 
- 
of an
alrbome battlefield surveillance svstem covenng a
rangc of ovcr 200 km, covenng both fixed and
nlo\rng obiects The rcsults of tlls studf urll also
bc drscussed rn thc follourrg chapter
79 Italr. for rts part. has defined a
commurucatrons and urformation svstcm (C ATRIN)
uhrch compnscs thrrc subsvstcms. onc cach for
commurucations (SOTRN) battlefield surveillance
(SORAO) and arspace sun,eillance and control
(SOATCC) The SORAO subsl'stcm compnscs
sensors and a nehvork of data merge centres. The
scnsors are both arbome (drones and Creso) and
ground-based (radar. ffiared. acoustic and laser)
The Creso sensor uill be descnbed further on
80 Lastlr'. GermanrJs Egrett-Prismaprograrnme
got undcr uav ur 1987 Thrs conssted of an
arrbome platform fl1rng at very high altrtude uhose
mam featurc \\'as a ven' lugh-resolution lmagmg
radar s1'stcm. uslng Amcncan tcchnologl', for
obsen'rng non-movmg battlcfield oblccts o\,er a
rangc of 200-250 km Thc programme camc to a
halt rn 1993
8l Four of the larger Europcan countries
therefore have been makmg considerable mvest-
ments m ground sun'erllance for some timc. urthout
a srngle studl'havrng becn underLrkcn rrrth a vle\\'
to Europcan cooperatlon
82 Nevertheless an analr'sis of the rvork that has
alreadv been done reveals manv srmrlarities. a fact
that can be erplarncd bv stronglv conr,'ergurg needs
83 Consequentlv rt can bc rrfcncd that at a trme
of trghter mrhtary expendrture budgets, it rs more
essentral than ever to ehcrt a defirutron of European
requrrements that encompasses vrrtually all natronal
nccds. to uluch rrught be addcd. wrthrn lrnits.
ccrtam rtcms to mcret hrghlv specrfic requlremcnts
W. Airborne solutions envisaged
8.1 In recent vears. a number of European
countries havc made substantial efforts to develop
arrbomc ground sun'eillancc s1'stems. Somc of
these pro3ects are currentlv at a standstrll. others are
conturumg and have reached therr development or
productron stages. ii'tule others still. like the French
Honzon svstem. are already'm sen"rce.
85 These s1'stems fall rnto three maJor
categones fixed-rung. rotan.\\'urg and drones or
UAVs
Fked-wing systems
ft) I'he Umted Krngdom's Astor arborne s),stem
tt6 The Bntrsh Dcfence Mrrustn' rs planning thc
development m a \-ear or so of a ne\\' airbome
battlcfield sun'eillance svstem called Astor. for
Arbome Stand-Off Radar Although Astor's
ongural desrgn has rn fact undergone changcs rr
recent )'ears. rt no\\' seems to have been
consohdated. It consists of a an arrcraft fllrng at
hrgh altrtude equrpped urth hlo tlpes of extremely
soplustrcated radar s'n'stems: Mor.rng Target
lndrcator (MTI) and Srnthetrc Aperture Radar
(SAR), supplemented b1' optical facrlrties. Thrs
svstem should mcet both army and air force
requlrements
8l Data collcctcd urll bc anall'scd pnmanly rn
thc ground centres. uhrch have a radro rclar,' link to
the scnsors In fact the Astor-t1pc solutron uorks
on thc assumptron that thc arrbornc platform should
onlv carn' scnsors x'hrlc uralvsrs and control
facrlrtres rrrll be more cfficrent rf locatcd on the
ground.
88 Hou'ever the platform's small sze makes it
unlkcll that rt could accommodate the various
complementary sensors that u'ould be extrcmell'
useful The Astor sl stcm competes urth the United
States'JSTARS svstem. u'hich rt rs proposed should
be camed on NATO suneillance aircraft rn the
future
89 The Unitcd Krngdom currently has tx'o
arrcraft optlons for the neu' surveillance s)'stems,
t2
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the Raltheon-modrfied Global Express and
Lockheed Martut's converted Gulfstream V.
90 These were selected in February 1995 for
prehmrnary feasibilrty' studres for sy'stems uhch
should be operational betu'een 2001 and 2003. The
studres have led to two competlng tenders for
development and production of fivc aircraft and up
to rune ground stattons. Both tenders use
commercial arrcraft capable of reaclung altitudes of
around 15 000 metres as platforms.
91. The Lockheed Martrr project rnvolves a
Gulfstream V fittcd luth a radar system whch
Racal has bcen developrng for four )€ars.
lpckheed Martrn's matn assocutes in the project arc
Marconi Defencc Systems. u'ho urll suppll'all the
commumcations and data-processrng svstems,
Logica for the softlvare, Marshall for the mobrle
equipment and ACE for the logrstical support
92. With regard to the Raytheon prolect, at the
recent 1996 Famborough Air Shou' the companl'
announced that it rvas to form a Bntish subsrdrarl'.
Ravtheon E-System Ltd (RESL), nhich u'ould
manage the project if rt u'ent ahead
93. The aircraft Raytheon ls proposmg is
Bombardrer-Canadar's nerv Global Express. RESL
rvould utcorporatc a radar systcm denved from the
ASARS svstem developed b1'Hughes for the U-2
spl,plane. ufuch uould be modrfied in Europe by
GEC-Marcoru and Thomson CSF. The marn
prqcct parmcrs. apart from those already
mentioned, u'ould be Shofis, responsible for
modrfuurg the arrframe, utule Marshall u'ould
provrde thc mobrle equipment and Motorola and
Cossor the ground statlons.
94 Tr.ro further projects have subsequentll' been
added to tlus list. The first uuolves Northrop
Grumman u'hich, despite berrg ehmrnated at the
start of the prehmmary feasrbilrtl' stage, has agam
entered the race rvith its JSTARS svstem (usurg a
converted Boeurg 707 as a platform) which has
been ur productton sincc March 1996. The
Amencan ar force has placcd an order for 20 such
svstems
95 The second rs a Lockheed Martin project. At
the 1996 Farnborough Ar Shorv the companl'
promoted its old U-2, for rvhich the Britrsh have
asked for a cost studl'
96. To your Rapporteur's ua1' of thinking, the
last two prolects rarse a number of drfficulties w'hen
lookmg ahead beyond 30 1'ears of use Both use
platforms that are no longer beurg burlt todav.
furthermore. it is not at all clear that the technologl'
can be transferred to British urdustry
97 Moreover it must be stressed that u'hatever
pro.;ect the Uruted Kmgdom chooses, tt urll ur large
part be Amencan given that most of the comparues
rnvolved in the brd havc their ongins on the other
side of the Atlantic
(u) France's Mosta arborne system
98. Francc dulv took the decrsion to acquire a
helicopter-mounted s1'stem. Honzon, ufuch. as has
been noted ear[er, ts currentlt' in servlce. No
decrsion has yet been reached on u'hether to acquire
a fixed-wrng s1,stem. Holvever, studres have been
camcd out by French firms on a pro;ect for a
European high-altitude surveillance s)'stem.
99 Hence Dassault Electronique ts offerrng a
European sy'stem called Mosta (optrmum land and
air surveillance system) wtuch rs cssentnll)' a
platform accommodaturg a number of morutonng
sensors u'hose complementarity mcans that prectse
urformatron about the tactical sltuation rt the zone
under observahon can be obtained onhne. In its
basic configuratlon. the arnlysrs statton rs located
on the surface (on the ground or on a shrp).
100 The svstcm. u'hrch is equrpped both urth
slnthetrc aperture and MTI radar s1'stems, also has
a recelver and clcctrorucs rrtelhgence demodulator
(ELINT), a recelver and demodulator (COMINT)
for rntelhgence gathered b1' commumcattons
rnterceptron, wideband data links and a hrgh-
capacitl memory.
l0l. The airbome platform emsaged 1s zrn
enhanced-capabrlrty Airbus A319. The atrcraft
rvould have a 9-hour flight range and uould flr' at
over 12 000 metres; rr-flight fuellng could extcnd
that penod to 19 hours. All the rndrcations are that
the European electrorucs rrdustry ls m a posttton to
develop such s1'stems rn under ten ycars
(nr) The Unrted States system
102 Thc JSTARS s1'stem on offer from the
Umted States is the outcome of cooperation betu'een
the US armv and atr force. The s1'stem consists of a
(Bocrng 707) fourrngrred let fitted uath SAR and
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many other sensors, covenng. m theory', an area
rangmg from 16 kn? to 250 000 kn2.
103. A fairly large crerv of some 15-17 members
is required to operate the on-board s)'stem, u,hrch rs
very heaw, being desigred to rntegrate detectron.
search and morutonng functrons on a smgle arbome
platform. It results from the need to be able to
pro1ect an autonomous s1'stem for the surverllancc
and conduct of operatrons over a long drstance on
the assumptron that longdrstance, hgh data-rate
commurucatlons are not possible However it
should be noted that thrs "autonomous" system must
be combrned urth an AWACS and its escorts.
104 JSTARS rvas used dunng the Gulf War and
more rec€ntly rn Bosrua, where rt operated uith
unmanned Predator-hpe aircraft. The Amencan arr
force has only verl'recently'secured approval for it
to go mto productron, notwtthstandmg reservations
in Congress and the Pentagon about one or tuo of
its operational capabrlitres
Rotary-wing systems
@ France's Honzon hehcopter-mounted svstem
105. The Honzon s)'stem is nou'operatronal. The
French army' took dehvery of its first system rn July,
1996 and rs to recerve a second at the end of 1997.
Honzon can take radar rnages of any vehicle
mo\mg fastcr than 6 lcn pcr hour. The system can
detect, locate, analvsc and automalcally classrfi'
from a urthdrau'al position any monng target up to
a range of 200 km ovcr a huge area, day' or rught,
irrespective of ueather condrtions. It can also
provrde mstantaneous puuloranuc surverllance of an
area of over 20 000 knr rn ten scconds.
106. Horizon also has the advantage of berrg
extremelv flexible to use as, rn the cvent of an
emergenc\', an aircraft can take off raprdly' for the
observation zone u'here rt can perform rndependcnt
analysis operatrons because rt cames the same
equrpment as the ground statron. Each helicopter
has a flrght range ofabout four hours and can cover
drstances up to I 000 lfln at an average herght of
4 000 metrcs It has a cruisurg speed of 270 kn an
hour and 180 kn an hour u'hen on observatron
duh' Its field of action is hmited to tactical
surveillance on behalf of land forces.
107. Each Honzon system comprises a ground
statron urth two analysis umts and one data-
transmrssron unit, as rvell as tuo AS 532 W
Cougar hehcopters, adapted for all-u'eather flrghts.
each llrth multrmode radar (MTI, mappurg and
rrtercept), a data-processurg uruL operator console
for on-board proc€sslng, nar.rgatronal and radro-
commurucation svstems and a secure data hnk.
108 It rs rvorth notrng that a European company,
Eurocopter. ls one of the pnncrpal productlon
assocrates for the Honzon radar sy'stem, supplyrng
the Cougar hehcopters and the operator consolcs
The other assocntes are Thomson CSF (radar
apphcatrons) and Dassault Electroruque (Agatha
data hnks and ground statrons)
109. The Honzon sy'stem can be used to
supplement other surverllanc€ svstcms, parficularlv
for UAV mrsslon dcfimtion and optimrsatron It can
also operate rn synergy with fixed-u.rng surveillance
systems. rn obsenrng areas masked bv a srte's
topograptucal features, for example
(r) The Itahan Creso hehcopter-mounted s),stem
I10. In 1987, Ital1' began development on rts
Creso project compnsrng an Agusta helicopter and
an advanced radar svstem capable of obsemng
movmg battlefield objects over a 50-kn range. The
sy'stcm has hostrle radar detection sy'stems,
constltutmg an advantage over systems already
descnbed
1l I Data is trarsmrttcd by mrcrorvave lmk to the
data merge and analysrs centrc The system is able
to detect movcment at a distancc of over 75 km
The hehcopters have roughly a 4-hour flight range
and an average speed ofaround 225km per hour.
The s1'stem rs currently in rts devclopmcnt phase.
Drones
lI2. At the present time, tactical and regrmental
drones are avarlable to Europeans Prolccts for the
constructlon of hrgh altitude-strength drones are
berng studred.
ll3. The French firm SAGEM has developed a
senes of drones such as the short-range Crecerelle,
uscd b1, the French arm)' for reconnaissance
mrssions, or the medrum-range Spenver, for the
Dutch armv
I14. Crecerelle is the only, European drone of its
class and rs used for tactrcal recorumssance,
14
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morutoring and target-acquisition tasks It has a
maxrmum speed of 250 km per hour, an operatmg
range of 60-70 l<rn and can rcach a height of 3 500
metres.
115 The CL289. a loint French. German and
Canadran{esigred UAV, w'hrch came rnto
operational servlce rn 1990, is fitted ll'rth a Piver
s1'stem. lvluch drarvs upon Aerospattale's
expenence m aIrN' rntelhgcnce-gathenng. The
s)'stem rs capablc of on- or oFline processurg of
rmages recerved from vehrcles lke the CL289.
116. Thc Pn'er-CL2S9 sl,stem is able to meet
urcreasrngll'spccrfic requrements 
- 
it has been used
b1'the German Army' surce 1990 and the French
Army smce 1992. lt has a maxrmum speed of 741
kn per hour. an operatrng range of 180-200 kn and
operates at altitudes bets'een 150 and 600 metres.
ll7 The Pirat unmanned air vetucle usmg
fibreoptrcs technologl', unveiled al Eurosaton-
1994, rvas developed in response to nen' operattonal
needs. This ts a loxer-performance sy'stem whose
marn task s to seek out, refine, or confirm "over-
the-ndge" rntelhgence. It has a flrght range of 30 to
60 mrnutes and a range of onll' 15 lcn
ll8 The Brevel rs a small, hght and stealthy'
UAV. developed ;orntll' by France and Germany.
The programme began n 1992 and the aircraft is
due to go mto sen,lce urth the French and German
armres rn 1998. hou'ever the French arml' wrthdrew
from the programme at the start of 1996.
I 19 The sy'stem rs developed b1' Eurodrone. an
cconomic rnterest grouplng set up b1' Matra Defense
and STN Atlas Electromk (part of the Bremer
Vulkan Group). The Brevel carries out tactrcal
surverllance, target-acquisitron and destgnatton
tasks and damage assessment Its flrght range rs
roughll'ten hours at speeds betrveen 120 to 200 km
per hour.
120. The French army's wrthdrau'al has put an
end to Europe's most ambrtious UAV cooperation
prograrnme and onc wtuch u'ould have been able to
meet ertremell' demanding opcrational requirements
over the ner1 20 1'ears in urdelv vanmg theatres of
operatlon.
l2l The Urutcd tingdom's Ro1'al Arr Force, for
its part. rs currentlv examrrung the possibility of
replacrrg the svstcm rn semce by' a long-range
UAV. such as Darkstar. Other European countries
arc also rvorkrng on the development of their
respectrve drones.
122 Lastl.v, lxgh-altitude drones are srll at the
desrgn-stud1'phase. Such is the case of Sarohale
(long-endurance reconnaissance and observaron
aerospace s1'stem) which is able to undcrtakc
multiple tasks.
123 Aerospatiale is currently' urvolved in the
desrgn studv of tlus ncrv system which rs able to
undertake lrrtualll' permanent recoruuussance of
very remote areas, rn conlunctton wrth urtermittent
surveillancc by' satellrte or othenrise It could
undertakc a rvhole gamut of cilrl or nulitarl' tasks
ranglng from observatton. detectton and earlv
balhstic-mrssrle uamrng (extended air defence) to
targct designation and rncludrng environmental
surverllance It wrll fl1' at altitudes of up to l8 000
mctres, thus allou'rng it to avoid cilT lian ar traffic
problems and makrng rt virtualll' unulnerable to
antl-aircraft defence s1'stems. It u'ould havc a flrght
range ofbehreen 20 and 24 hours
124 Sarohale incorporates a modular pa1'load
s1'stem consistrng of radar. opttcal. rnfrared and
laser rntercept svstems. These may be used
interchangeabll'accordrng to a misston or all camed
on board. The svstem as a whole may be operated
b1'prlot or remote control
125 SAGEM rs currentlv designtng the Horus-
Predator UAV uluch rvould have 24-hour flight
autonomv and a range lrruted onll' by the arcraft's
flight endurance. as thc latter rvould be equipped
wrth satelhte transmrssion, For thrs purpose,
SAGEM rvould use a US-built camer, the Predator.
rrcorporatmg its oxn payload in the arrcraft's
mtenor, and uould supplf its own ground statlon
126 Lastly, your Rapporteur feels that drones
uarrant special study by'the Commrttee. both on
account of therr rmportance to airbome survctllance
todav and their even greater mportancc rn the
future. given that these are lugh-pcrformance
s)'stems offenng extra advantages at a trmc uhen
both the armed forces and the general pubhc are
agreed on a "zero deaths" oblective for mrhtan'
operations.
127 Tlus spccral report should provrde an
exhaustive anall'srs of the sublect. and look beyond
Europe so as to mclude rn lts assessment such
s)'stems as the lrghll' mnovatlve CL327 verttcal
take-off and landrng aircraft built b1' Bombardrer-
15
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Canadar, ur whrch a large number of European
countnes are alread)' shourng mterest and u'hrch
mrght be one area u'here Europe and lts
transatlantic allies could cooperate.
WI. Conclusions
128 European coutnes have seen their defence
budgets substantiallv reduced m recent 1'ears and all
the rndrcatrons are tlut that trend is un}kely to be
reversed It is extremely' rmportant therefore that
our present surveillance needs are met through a
range of s1'stems that are lughll- costrffective.
129 As notcd earlier, strategic needs can clearly
be met by a satelhtc s1'stem that uses optroruc and
ralar sensors but llhcn rt comes to tactical
requirements, an airbome system ls necessztn'
130. In the hght of the tasks it u'as decrded to
undertake at Petersberg and the recent decrsions
NATO reached 1r:r Berlin. rt is not easv to
comprehend why the Council has not mstructed the
Plannmg Cell to carry-out a study'to determrne u'hat
WEU's operational needs are.
131 It is also drfficult to understand the lrmted
use the WEU Councrl is makrng of the Satellite
Centre. and more specificalll'of the ven,useful tool
it has in the Hehos I satellrte. especially as the
countncs mvolved rn that project are prepared to
respond to requests and as our o\\m Orgarusation
actuallr' has sufficrent financial resources.
132 As far as the airbomc solutions descnbed in
ttus report. and partrcularly the rotary-urng option,
are concemed, only one system 
- 
Honzon 
- 
is
currently operatronal Thrs rs largelv due to
European cooperation and rt appears to offer the
most advantageous features
133. Your Rapporteur urll refram from drawrng
any conclusions u'here UAVs are concerned until a
specialised, rrdepth studl'has been camed out on
tlls option It rs therefore for the Commrttee to take
a decisron to that end.
134. Tumrng to the fixed-u'ing option, the premrse
avarlable on the second-hand market- rn order to
hold down development costs and the unt cost of a
platform, s a reasonable one, since a regular carrier
arrcraft reachrng the end of its commercral hfe rs of
great interest to a nulitary user both rr terms of
potential flyng time and costrffectrveness.
135. Gulfstream Aerospace's Gulfstream V
aircraft and Bombardrer's Global Express, no\\' ln
the final stages of development, urll take ten vears
to reach the second-hand market. These aircraft
have a total liftoff mass of some 45 tonnes and are
able to fl1' at an altrtude of 20 000 metres carryng
tllo torules of observation equipment, wtuch
suggests that thel' could only start their observation
crurse at an altrtude of some 12 000 metres.
136. Moreover. in the same famrlv of aircraft. u'e
have one (the Arrbus A3l9) in the final stages of
development and another (thc Arrbus A320) about
to come on to the second-hand market. The total
lrftoff mass of these arcraft ls some 68 and 77
tonnes respectively, they' can fll' at an altrtude of
15 000 metres and, uith an observatron svstem
weighing 3.7 tonnes, could start ther observaUon
cruise at an altitude of roughly 12 000 metres
137 Their endurance penods at the observation
statron can be assumed to be comparablc, the
essentnl drfference berrg rn the marrmum permitted
mass for the observation s1'stem. Ail the urdrcatrons
are that, rn prurciplc, an observation system urth a
mass of 2 tonnes u,ould have to be limited to radar
modes plus satellrte transmission, w'hile a mass of
3 7 tonnes u'ould mean that a complete s),stem
could be urstallcd
138. Furthermore. under certarn crcumstances it
rrught be considered necessar), to can), a small
crew, capable of carryng out tasks m areas that
might not be covered by }ugh-florv satellrte relar'
data
139 Everlthrng rvould seem to pourt to the
conclusion that the A3l9lA320 platforms not onll'
offer facilities that are of greater rnterest than thosc
offercd by other platforms, but are also supenor to
them
t6
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il33
I Weather raclar radome
2 Sealetl toruarrl bulkhead
3 Lippcr f'onrard compartmcnt{ Lo."ver tor B urd con)partment
5 Elcctronrcs
6 Statrc tuhe
7 Srdeslrp probc
8 \{'rndscreen
9 Instrument pancl
10 Prlot's ruddcr blrs
ll De-rcrng duct
l2 Cockprt t'loor
l-1 Nose gear retractlon s$a;,-hrace
l{ Nose gear srrut
l5 Steenng cr lrnders
l6 Nose gear t\\'rn-u'hecl\
17 Torque hnks
18 Nose gear hatch
l9 Cockprt partrrlon
20 Prlot's seat
2l Steerrnq $heel
22 EFIS lnstrument\
2-1 Central console
2.1 Throttlc levers
25 Co-prlot's seat
26 Co prlot's steenng u,heel
27 Ovcrhead panel
28 Starboard console
29 Cockprt L'ntrance door
30 Seat track
3l Fusel.rge frames and strlfeners
32 Cabrn floor
-13 Arrstarr hantlrarl
34 lntegratetl arrstarr
35 Cabrn closulc door
36 Arrstarr retractlon mecharnl\m
37 Entrance door
38 Avronrcs conlpartment
39 Arr condrtronrn-u duct
.10 Cabrn tloor strueture{l Avronrcs
.12 Heatrng duct
.13 Cupboard
.l.l Cupboard shdrng door
.15 VHF comntunlcatlons anterlrra
46 Cabrn lccess ar:le
il7 Cabrn pJrtltron
{8 Rer oll rng armcharr
'19 Cabrn lrghtrng
50 Cabrn srtleuall lrnrng
5l Seat tre-doun tracks
52 \\'nturg tlcsk
5-1 Table
5.1 Wrng-to fusclage larrrng
55 Landrng headlrght
56 Cabrn partrtron
57 Arr condrtronrnq duct
58 Amcharr
59 Heat erchangcr
60 Sota
6l Fuselage centre \cctlon fiames and
str ffeners
62 Fuel lrnes
6-l Partrtron
6.1 Double armchatr
65 Foldrng trav
66 Cabrn floor
67 Rear u rng itre\\ ab\orptron lrame
68 False spar absorptton frantc
69 Fut-l hnes
70 Fuellrng port
7l Fuel dump srstem
72 Inner camber flap
73 lnner sporler
74 Canrber flap gurde-track llrrrnu
75 Centrc camber flap
76 Gurde-track tnrrrng
77 Outcr camber flap
78 Outer canrbcr tlap farnn_e
79 Arleron
80 Starboartl engrnc pod
81 Engrne py'lon
82 Engrne attrchrnent ftttlng
83 Starboard fucl tank
8.1 Fuel lrne
85 Sealed rear bull,hcad
86 Arr-condrtronrng duct
tl7 Torlet compartntent
88 Torlet door
89 Galler
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151 lnncr camber flap rn null postttou
152 Marn landtng gear tu'tn-whcels
l5-l N,[arn landrng gear
15{ Landrng gear rctraetron actuator
155'l'runnron block
156 Landrng gear \hock strut
157 Inner sporler
158 Camher flat gurde-track and ballscrew
actuator
159 Camber f'lap track farrrng
160 Camber t'lap rn ertended po\ltron
w 7A
n ll7 Tarl plane maln plvot
118 Tarl plane rernforced
119 TaLl plane strucrure
120 Tarl planc front spar
121 Rudder
122 Rudder po\ler unrt
l2-l Frn box centre spJr
l2il Frn tror rear \par
125 ,\PLr nozzle erhaust
111
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90 Baggagc'hold door
91 Engrnc mounttng fianre
92 Arr-conthtronlng duct
93 Heat erchanger
94 Arr-condrttontng untt
95 Arr-condrtronrng \y\tcm atr lnlet
96 Arr outlet
97 Ar tontcs
98 Rear engrne rlountrng frame
99 Frrr tront spar
100 HF communlcatrons antenna
101 Frn box nbhrng tnd sttffeners
102 Yau'damper
l0-1 Automatrc prlot \ervo-control unlt
10.1 Eler atron quadrant
105 VOR,TLOC antcnna
106 Tarl plane
107 Front prvot
108 Satellrte comlnunlCatlon\ antenna
109 Tarl plane
I l0 Eler ator
ll1 Antlstatlc tratlcd u'tres
164 112 Parkrng lrght
I 13 Frn uppcr larrrng
ll.l Elevator \tructure
I l5 Elevator boosler
ll6 Elevator rods
126 Parkrng Lght
127 APU nozzle
128 Auxrhary po\rer unrt (APLT)
129 APU arr rnlet
l-10 APU duct
l-11 Oxygen
l-12 APU bav acc*s hatch
l-13 Port engrnc pl lon
134 Port engrne nozzle
l-15 Thrust rnvcrser lower clanrshell
136 Thrust Inverser upper clanrshell
l-17 Engrne nozzle cage
138 BM\\' Rolls-Ro1ce BR7 l0 turbolet
englne
139 Engrne leed hnes nnd ducts
lilO Equrpment unrt
141 Engrnc scttlng access hatch
142 Full authont) drgrtal engrne control
(FADEC)
1{3 Engrne pod
1{.1 Engrne arr rnlet
l{5 Luggage hold
l.16 Equrpment bay
lilT Carnber flap dnve motor
l.l8 N'larn landrng gear hatch
1.19 Camber flap control drtre shaft
150 Arleron control cables and pullel s
161 Arleron
162 Arleron structure ln c()rnposltes
163 Wrnglet
164 Antrstatrc trarled wrre
165 Navrgatron and parkurg hghts
166 Warpage servo-unlt
167 Arloron control quadrant
168 Fucl lrne
169 Mobrle leadrng edge
170'*'rng structure box
l7l N{obrle slat gurde-track
172 Slat control ballscreu actuttor
l7-i Fuellrng port
17.1 De-rcrng duct
175 Fuel leedlrne
176 Internal tuel hncs
177 Fuel pump
lTtl Rear u rng-to-fuselage Junctlon
179 Wlng-to-tuselage retnforced liame
180 Wrng box rcrnfbrced nbbrng
llll Boost pump
182 Front wrng spar
l8.l Nlobrle \lat control torque
shaft
l8.l De-rcrng duct coupler
185 Front wrng-to-fuselagc Junctlon
186 Structural tuel tank
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83 Centrc track
8.1 Outer :porlcr
ll5 Wrng strllenr.rs
116 Outer track
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GULFSTREAM V
I Radonrc
2 Weathcr r.rdar antenna
3 Radar mechanrsm support fiame{ Radar rlechanrsm
5 Nose gear hatch
6 Oxlgen cvlrnclers
7 Sealed loruard bulkhead
{l Nose gear uheel hou:rng
9 ,A.rr data probe
l0 \lindshrcld
ll Cockprt panel vrsor
l2 Cathode-ray tuLre cockprt ln\trument\
l-l Rudder bar nrechanrsm
l.l Rudder bar pcdals
l5 Cockprt floor
16 Nose gear bar
l7 Nose gear strut
18 Taxr hght
19 Nose gear u'heels
20 Torque hnks
2l Nose 
-{ear door
22 Lockrng strut
23 Landrng gear hydraulrc retractlon aetuator
2{ Cockprt structurc
25 Srde console
26 Prlot's seat
27 Rear cocLprt partltlorl
28 Stde * rndou
29 Electncal panel
30 Central console
31 Co-prlot's seat
-12 Fusc panel
33 Avron;es compartment
3{ Fuselaec lrilme
35 Foru,ard ilrcssrng roon.r
36 Lugga-ue compartment
-17 Vestrbule
-J8 Entrance cloor
39 Retractable .rrrstarr
5
.10 Handrarl
.ll Cabrn entrance
.12 Cabrn partttron
.l-l Arr condttrontng duct
4{ Bar
il5 Foldrng table
{6 Rr'r'olvrng seat
{7 Srtleuall hnrng
48 Three seater sturiro couch
.19 VHF antenna
-50 .A.ntr colhsron lrghr
5l VHF .rntenna
52 Wrng-to-fuselagc larrrng
53 Wrndow panel lorver spar
5.1 Cabrn u rndou
55 Wrndori panel upper spar
56 Nlovahle partrtron
57 l\'larn franrt-
58 Seat trc-doun tr.rck
59 Landrng headhght
60 Leadrn,q edge de-rcrng duct
61 Wlnq-to-lirselage front attachment
62 Wrng root rrbhrng
6-l Front u ms \par
6.1 False spal
65 Wrng-to tuselage rear att.lchment
66 Rear spar
67 N'[arn fi.rnre
68 Self-strffenrn g rrbbrng
69 Leadrng etlgc hor
70 Landrng ge.rr h1'drauhc retractron
actuator
7l Marn landrng gear :trut
72 Landrng gear shock strut
7-1 Trarhng uheclr
7.1 TnrrLng ed_re firetl sectron
75 Canrber tlap rntcrnal gurde track
76 Sporler mechanrsm
77 Sporlcr control hydraulrc actuator
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ruk* 87 Arleron88 Fuelhng port
89 Le.rdrng eclgc
90 Plrkrng hght
91 Trarhn,r.r edge fixed sectron
92 Wrnglet
93 Trarlrng ed_[e farrrnu
9{ Rcar cabrn partltron
95 Ftretl seat
78 Foriler trpc'camber l-1np
79 Sporler
80 \\ing bor nhhrng
8l Fuel hne
82 Camber flap strut
16t
17P
1b
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126 Engrne nozzle
127 Engrne pylon
128 Water extractor
129 Tarl fin rear attachment frame
130 Electronrcs
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138 Fin centre spar
139 Elevatron trrmmer shaft
1.10 Fin tiont spar
141 Frn leadrng edge
142 Frn de-rcrng duct
143 Frn bor
144 VHF omnrrange antenna
145 Rudder centre beanng
1.16 Elevatron countershaft
175 Wrnglet
176 Parking hght
177 Leadrng edge de-rcrng duct
178 Tank closure rtbbtng
179 Sporlers
180 Arleron equaltser
181 Wrng-to-tuselagt' farnng structure
96 Two-seater sota
97 Fotding table
98 Galley entrance
99 Reinforced rear bulkhead
100 Galley
101 Bar
102 Torlets
103 Dressrng room
104 Access to rear luggage hold
105 Arr-condrtronrng duct
106 Pressurc-sealed rear bulkhead
107 Engrne arr rnlet
108 Engrne pod
109 Air-rnlet front baffle
110 Engrne fan
1ll Engrne mount front fittrng
112 BMW,rRolls-Royce BR7 I 0-4ti turbojet
engrne
113 Full authont) drgrtal engine control
(FADEC)
100
l.l7 Rudder spar
148 Rudder structure
149 Stabrlator ballscrew actuator
150 Elevatron rod
151 Tarl plane leadrng edge de-rcrng duct
152 Tarl plane front spar
153 Tarl plane nbbrng and stlffeners
154 Rear spar
155 Tarl plane survel tittrng
156 Elevatron spar
157 Elelatron rudder structure
158 Elevatron rudder
159 Elevatron trrmmer
160 Antrstatrc trarled wrres
161 Elevatron equahser
162 Frn farrrng
163 Elevatron rudder
164 Starboard tarl plane
165 Engrne nozzle
166 Starboard engrne
167 Engrne pllon
168 Camber flap rn lou'ered po\rtton
169 Camber flap gurde-track
170 Camber flap ballscrew' actuator
l7l lntegrated fuel tank
172 Fuel hnes
173 Starboard arleron
174 Fuelhng port
90
l14 Hot sectron
115 Thrust reverser lower sectron
116 Thrust reverser upper sectron
l17 Engrne mount rear fithng
118 Hydrauhc tank
119 Auxrlary power unrt (APU)
120 APLI nozzle
121 Arr-condrtronrng duct
122 Cabrn conditronrng arr rnlet
123 ADF antenna
124 Tarl fin front attachrnent trame
125 Elevahon and course control hvdraultc
actuator
O AIR & COSMOS _1996
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131 Fuselage rear sectlon stlflcners
132 Trarl fin central attachment frame
1-33 Doppler navrgatron antenna
l3Ll Rudder
135 Rudder lower beartng
136 Frn rear spar
137 Elevatron lever
@'
\
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g-3 Wrng bor
5.1 Leadrng edge mobrle u,rng slats
55 Wrng box tront spar
56 Wrng box reinforced nbbrng
57 Box strffener
58 Re'ar spar
59 Rear attachment fittln_c
60 Engrne pod
61 Engrnr'prlon
62 Atr ctxdrtronrng unrt
6-1 Start-up duct
64 Engrne arr rnlet
65 Arr rnlet tle-rcrng duct
66 Full authonty chgrtal engine control
(FADEC)
67 CFMI turbojet en_stne
68 Compressor \tator e ilse
69 Thrust re\erser
3e
'?f
% If,li,\
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70 Fan outler
7l Nozzle prpe
72 Nozzlc
73 Pl lon attachrncnt
7.1 Engrne front attachment
75 Engrne rear rttachments
76 Marn landrng gear sway-brace
77 Man landrng gear retractron actuatr)r
78 Main landrng gcar twrn-u,heels
79 Marn landrng gear shock strut
80 Leadrng edse outer slats
81 Slat de-rcrng duct
82 Nlobrle slat 
,curdc-tracks
83 Mobrle slat drrre shall
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I Radonre
2 Wcathcr rJdar entennl
3 Radar antenna support
.l Nose cone
5 Screen-n rpe
6 Wrndscreen
7 Prlot's rudder bar
8 Cockprt t'loor
9 Forward bulkhead
10 Control pitncl vrsor
ll Overhead systems panel
12 Co-prlot's seat
1-l Prlot's seat
lil Wrndscreen framc
15 Nose gear hateh
16 Nose gear ba1
l7 Electncal compartmcnt hatch
l8 Avronrcs compartrnent hatch
19 Nose gear twrn-wheels
20 Nose gear torque lrnks
2l Nose gear steenn{.I control
22 Nose gear shock strut
23 Nose gear surrel tittrng
24 Nose gear retractlon actualor
25 Nose qear suay-brace
26 Cabrn entrance door
27 For*'ard galley
2{l Cockprt parritron
29 Cabrn partrtron
30 Doorirame structure
-ll VHF antenna
32 Entrance door
-13 Frrst-class seats
34 Hold hatch
35 Forward hold
36 Frrst/tounst class partttlon
37 Luggagc racks
38 Srdew'all lrnrng
39 Tounst class reats
.10 Cabrn floor
.11 Seat tre-doun tracL
42 Hold
43 Wrndou's
{;l Wrng-to-f uselage tarrrng
{5 Leading edge slat gurde-track:
46 Wrng stress absorptron tiames
47 Central tuselage trulkhead box
Ll8 Hoop frames
{9 Fuselage strt'fencrs
50 Box rernforced rrbbrng
5l Emergency eut
52 Front box spar
34
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8.1 End wrng bor
85 Wrng bor strllener
86 Parkrng and navrgatron hghts
87 Wrnglets
88 Antrstatrc trarled wrres
89 Arleron
90 Canrber llap track farrrng
91 Erternal camher flap
92 Carbon tlbre composlte outr-r spoller
93 Carbon fibre composrte centre \poller
94 Carbon tibre composlte ccntrc \poller
95 Carbon fibre composrte rnner sporler
96 Camber flap track thrnng
97 Inner can'rber flap
98 Sporler
99 Landrng gear well
100 N'larn landrng gear support frttlng
100
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l0l Camber tlap dlve shali
102 Farnng structure
103 Rear hold hatch
l0{ Rear hold
105 Arr condrtronrng duct
106 Passenger cabrn
107 Luggage rack
108 Cabrn cethng
109 Passenger cahin rear partltlon
ll0 Torlets
111 Rear 
-saller
112 Rear cntrance door
113 Rear sealed bulkhead
1l.l Rear structure
115 Tarl plane central bor
ll6 Tarl plane
117 Tarl plane tiont spar
I l8 Tarl plane box structure
I l9 Elevatron rudder
120 APLI nozzle
12l Aurrlarl po*,er unrt (APU)
122 Rudder
123 litlnelcomb structure
l2{ Frn
125 Frn structural sectron rn carbon fibre
composlte
126 Frn rear spar
127 Front spar
128 Frn rear attachment
129 Frn centre attachment
130 Frn tiont attachlnent
1-ll Starboard tarl unrt
132 VHF.rntenna
133 ADF.intenna
l-1{ Luggage rack
135 Intemal cabrn lrnrng
136 ADF antenna
137 Camber 11ap gurde-rrack larrrng
138 Camber flap
139 .Arleron
l.{0 \\inglet
1.11 Fuel tanL
142 Fuel hne
l{.1 LeadrnB c(lge mohrle \lat\
14,1 Engrne pylon
1.15 Engrnc pod
146 Condrtroncr Iouvre
1{7 Leadrng cdge rnner slat
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